



NEWSPAPER PUBLISHER HELD PARTY IN INTER-
EST TO PROTEST OF TELEVISION LICENSE
GRANTED WITHOUT HEARING
Both Ohio Valley Broadcasting Corporation and Clarksburg Broad-
casting Corporation applied to the Federal Communications Commission
for a permit to operate a new television broadcast station on the same
channel in Clarksburg, West Virginia. Clarksburg Broadcasting's applica-
tion was dismissed at its own request and Ohio Valley's application was
granted the next day without a hearing' and without prior notice of the
dismissal.' The Clarksburg Publishing Company, publisher of morning,
afternoon and Sunday newspapers in Clarksburg, protested the grant,
alleging that the substantial losses which would be caused by competition
with Ohio Valley for advertising revenue, together with the adverse effect
television usually has upon newspaper circulation, was sufficient economic
injury under the Communications Act to make it a "party in interest." 3
The publisher had alleged further that the grant would not be in the pub-
lic interest in light of Ohio Valley's payment of more than $14,000 to
Clarksburg Broadcasting Corporation and in light of the "widespread
influence" which the company controlling Ohio Valley would be able to
exert throughout West Virginia because of its ownership of all of the daily
newspapers in nine West Virginia cities, radio broadcasting stations in
Clarksburg and Parkersburg, West Virginia, and its substantial interest
in a television station operating in Wheeling which can also be received
in Clarksburg. This influence was alleged to be contrary to established
FCC policies against multiple ownership of television stations 4 and domi-
nation of news dissemination facilities by a single organization. 5 The FCC,
with three Commissioners dissenting, held despite Ohio Valley's objections
that the Publishing Company was a party in interest, postponed the effec-
tive date of the grant, and ordered that a hearing be held on the protest.
Ohio Valley Broadcasting Corp., FCC Docket No. 11004, April 15, 1954.
1. 48 STAT. 1085 (1934), as amended, 66 STAT. 715 (1952), 47 U.S.C. §309(a)
(Supp. 1952).
2. 47 CODE FED. REGS. § 1.371 n.10, e (1949).
3. 66 STAT. 715 (1952), 47 U.S.C. §309(c) (Supp. 1952).
4. FCC Rule 3.636, 18 FED. REG. 7799 (1953).
5. Mansfield Journal Co. v. FCC, 180 F.2d 28, 33 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Fostoria
Broadcasting Co., 13 F.C.C.-(1948); 17 GEo. WAsH. L. Rlv. 130.
(1080)
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in the 1952 amendments to the Communications Act Congress estab-
lished a procedure to permit protests on grants made without hearing.6
This right was given to "parties in interest," a term which had received
judicial construction in questions of intervention in agency hearings and
standing to secure judicial review.7 The doctrine that economic injury
may be sufficient to permit a party to appeal was first enunciated in FCC
v. Sanders Radio Station,8 which held that the holder of an existing radio
license was a "person aggrieved" who could secure judicial review of an
FCC order granting a potentially competing license, even though economic
injury to the original licensee was not an independent element in determin-
ing whether the license should be granted. In National Coal Association
v. FPC,0 relied upon by the FCC in the instant case, an association of coal
producers, the United Mine Workers and a representative of railroads
which hauled coal were permitted, as "aggrieved persons," to appeal a Fed-
eral Power Commission order which authorized construction of a gas pipe
line to an atomic energy plant. Other cases have denied an appeal to one
whose market would be affected by an order directed to a competitor, 10 but
the rule of the National Coal case is more widely followed on the theory
that, by the term parties in interest, Congress has created a group of
"private Attorney Generals" to keep agencies within their statutory bounds
and to appeal errors of law which might otherwise go unchallenged." By
utilizing the phrase "party in interest," Congress intended to apply the rule
of the Sanders case to the new protest provisions of the 1952 amendments.'
2
To the extent that standard radio broadcasters had been permitted to pro-
test the grant of television licenses, 13 the holding that one in a competing
medium of communications may be a party in interest is not novel. How-
6. 66 STAT. 715 (1952), 47 U.S.C. § 309(c) (Supp. 1952). See Wall and Jacob,
Communications Act Amendments, 1952-Clarity or Ambiguity, 41 GEo. L.J. 135
(1953).
7. WARNER, RADIO AND TELBVISlON LAW § 13(d) (1948) ; DAvis, ADMINISTRA-
TIV LAW § 205 (1951). See also Case Note, 49 COL. L. Rav. 579 (1949); Note,
52 YALE L.J. 671 (1943).
8. 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
9. 191 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1951). The fact that appeals from FCC decisions
are taken to this circuit court lends added significance to this decision.
10. Cf. United States Can & Sugar Refiners Ass'n v. McNutt, 138 F.2d 116 (2d
Cir. 1943) (adversely affected); A. E. Staley Co. v. Secretary of Agriculture, 120
F.2d 258 (7th Cir. 1940) (adversely affected). See Ex-Cell-O Corp. v. Chicago,
115 F.2d 627 (7th Cir. 1940) (declaratory action). It appears that courts have
not differentiated among the various statutory terms describing the group per-
mitted to appeal, whether "aggrieved" or "interested" persons.
11. Associated Industries of N.Y. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1943) (person
aggrieved); Reade v. Ewing, 205 F.2d 630 (2d Cir. 1953) (adversely affected);
Comment, 34 CORNELL L.Q. 608, 614-5 (1949).
12. SEN. REP. No. 44, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1952).
13. Versluis -Radio & Television, Inc., 3 PIKE & FISCHER AD. LAW 2d 365
(FCC 1953) ; T. E. Allen, 18 FED. REG. 2255 (FCC 1953). But cf. Yellow Cab Co.
of Chicago, 3 PIKE & FISCaER AD. LAW 2d 367 (FCC 1953) (taxicab company may
not protest grant of special radio service license to competitor) ; Kansas State
College of Agriculture and App. Sci., 2 PIE & FISCHER AD. LAW 2d 738 (FCC
1952) (representative of national broadcasters may not petition for reconsideration
of grant of an educational television license).
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ever, despite the interpretation given Sanders by the decision in National
Coal, the instant case is the first in which the FCC has recognized an un-
licensed person as a party in interest under the protest provisions.14 It is
uncertain whether the decision will enlarge the size of this group beyond
newspapers to include other competitors for advertising revenues and the
public's leisure time.
The rationale of the Sanders decision is to provide someone in addi-
tion to the agency to represent the public.15 This is particularly useful in
the case of the FCC, which has been ordered by Congress to provide tele-
vision service to all portions of the country as soon as possible but does not
have the manpower to investigate all applications thoroughly. 16 Thus, in
localities which have no existing service, unopposed applications may be
granted with little or no scrutiny. Although the grant of a license does
not give the licensee a property right, it has been difficult to convince the
FCC and particularly the courts that a license renewal should be denied
merely because an applicant with no substantial investment promises to give
better service. 17 Consequently, it may be better to keep some localities
temporarily without service rather than grant licenses to the irresponsible
or incompetent almost by default. This is the theory on which protest hear-
ings must be conducted, since a protest does not enable new applicants to
file and obtain a comparative hearing, but merely postpones the effective
date of the original grant.' 8 The principal factor against broadening the
scope of protest proceedings is the impairment of agency efficiency because
of delay and undue complication of issues by persons whose sole purpose
is to postpone the date at which any television service may be made avail-
able in their market areas.' 9 However, established intervention and stand-
ing doctrines favor those with the greatest motivation to use such dilatory
tactics. Although it is possible that the FCC and the courts had restricted
participation in proceedings under the Communications Act to licensees
in order to give them some protection from harmful competition, such an
approach, or any firm rule, might result in having no qualified person to
represent the public. Thus, in the instant case, since the nearest radio and
television stations are both associated with Ohio Valley, the protestant
might be the only one with sufficient adverse economic interest to object
to the grant. To minimize the problem of delay, the FCC may use its
14. Cf. Capital Broadcasting Co., 2 PIKE & FISCHER AD. LAW 2d 704 (FCC
1952), 21 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 368 (1953) (representative of riding public protesting
grant of a transit radio license).
15. See Associated Industries of N.Y. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1943).
16. Congress apparently has not relied solely on the statutory mandate to provide
service rapidly. See statement of Commissioner Frieda B. Hennock to a Senate Com-
merce subcommittee that "senatorial pressure" upon the FCC to speed grants and the
procedure for grants of licenses without a hearing do not protect the public interest.
Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, May 21, 1954, p. 9, col. 3.
17. Segal and Warner, "Ownership" of Broadcasting "Frequencies": A Review,
19 RocKY MT. L. R-v. 111, 120-2 (1947).
18. WHEC, Inc. and Veteran's Broadcasting Co., 18 FED. REG. 2109 (FCC
1953).
19. DAvis, AD.%INISTRATIVE LAW §203 (1951).
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statutory powers to "expedite" protest hearings 20 by testing the legal suffi-
ciency of public interest allegations before beginning lengthy factual in-
vestigations. Such a procedure, somewhat analogous to a demurrer, was
followed in the instant case.21 Since all protests must be verified, the




NONLIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE RULE NOT
APPLICABLE TO NUISANCE RESULTING
FROM NEGLIGENCE
Plaintiff sued a church congregation for injuries sustained when she
slipped and fell on an icy pavement in front of the rectory. The ice
resulted from a clogged downspout which channeled water from one corner
of the roof onto the sidewalk. The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed an
order overruling a demurrer, holding that the nonliability of charitable
organizations for torts by servants does not extend to suits for injuries
resulting from the maintenance of a public nuisance, even though the
nuisance was the result of negligence. Smith v. Congregation of St. Rose,
61 N.W.2d 896 (Wis: 1953). 1
Wisconsin and a majority of American jurisdictions have long held
that charitable organizations are not liable for the negligence of their
servants.2 Some of these jurisdictions have held charities responsible for
nuisances arising from conduct which the actor realized was potentially
harmful 3 or from activity normally entailing absolute liability,4 but these
20. 66 STAT. 715 (1952), 47 U.S.C. §309(c) (Supp. 1952).
21. These issues were set for oral argument on May 17, 1954, the FCC assuming
for purposes of the argument that all facts were undisputed and reserving the power
to institute fact finding proceedings later if Publishing Company's allegations were
legally sufficient to warrant denial of the application. Ohio Valley Broadcasting
Corp., 19 FED. REG. 2594 (FCC 1954).
22. 47 CODE FED. REGS. § 1.714 (1949).
1. Accord, Wright v. St. Mary's Hospital, 61 N.W.2d 900, 902 (Wis. 1953)
(decided the same day).
2. See Note, 25 A.L.R.2d 29, 142 (1952). For the rule in Wisconsin, see
Baldwin v. St. Peter's Congregation, 264 Wis. 626, 60 N.W.2d 349 (1953) ; Note, 25
A.L.R.2d 29, 198 (1952).
3. Vaughn v. Missouri Power & Light Co., 89 S.W.2d 699 (Mo. App. 1935)
(defendant continued to spray chemicals into the air after being notified of injury
to plaintiff's land) ; Peden v. Furman University, 155 S.C. 1, 151 S.E. 907 (1930)
(defendant leased land to professional baseball club with knowledge that harm to,
plaintiff's home must inevitably follow). In some jurisdictions following the majority
rule, nonliability extends to torts involving intentional misconduct as well as negli-
gence. See, e.g., Boardman v. Burlingame, 123 Conn. 646, 197 Atl. 761 (1938).
In Wisconsin, however, the courts have never had occasion to extend the rule beyond
nonliability for negligence.
4. Beecher v. Dull, 294 Pa. 17, 143 Atl. 498 (1928) (blasting); Cumberland
Torpedo Co. v. Gaines, 201 Ky. 88, 255 S.W. 1046 (1923) (storing explosives).
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decisions provide no authority for the exception made in the present case
with respect to negligent torts which are also nuisances. The leading case
of McFarlane v. City of Niagara Falls 1 recognized that there is often no
meaningful difference between those negligent torts which are denominated
nuisance and those which are not, and therefore refused to allow recovery
by a plaintiff who was contributorily negligent, even though the defendant's
negligent conduct could also be labeled nuisance. Certainly the tort in the
instant case, properly held to be a nuisance, 6 was caused by the negligence
of the employee of the congregation who failed to unclog the downspout
or clear the pavement.
Although imposition of liability on charitable organizations diverts
funds from their socially desirable activities, their ability to bear the risk of
loss by carrying insurance and the value of encouraging caution are ample
reason to hold them liable for the torts of their servants. 7 Accordingly,
several jurisdictions have abandoned completely the charitable nonliability
rule,8 including one state where the doctrine was as strongly entrenched as
in Wisconsin.9 It seems that the instant court felt unduly bound by prec-
edent in not following that example.1' Assuming that this judicial restraint
was proper, however, the question of whether the court was justified in not
assimilating nuisance to negligence, as was done in McFarlane, must still
be faced. The instant decision imposes liability for negligence resulting in
nuisance but not for other equally faulty negligent acts. Since many torts
may be called either negligence or nuisance,"- liability may well depend on
the way an attorney draws his complaint.' 2 Moreover, the distinction will
5. 247 N.Y. 340, 160 N.E. 391 (1928).
6. Although there is no Wisconsin case holding that ice on a sidewalk is a
nuisance, other jurisdictions have so held. Bixby v. Thurber, 80 N.H. 411, 118 Atl.
99 (1922); Leahan v. Cochran, 178 Mass. 566, 60 N.E. 382 (1901).
7. For a complete presentation of the arguments for and against liability of
charitable organizations for the torts of their servants, see Pierce v. Yakima Valley
Hospital, 260 P.2d 765, 769 (Wash. 1953) ; Note, 25 A.L.R.2d 29 (1952).
8. See Ray v. Tucson Medical Center, 72 Ariz. 22, 230 P.2d 220 (1951);
Haynes v. Presbyterian Hospital, 241 Iowa 1269, 45 N.W.2d 151 (1950); Silva v.
Providence Hospital, 14 Cal.2d 762, 97 P.2d 798 (1939) (overruling dictum of the
California Supreme Court and holdings of lower courts).
9. Pierce v. Yakima Valley Hospital, supra note 7.
10. Courts in jurisdictions other than Wisconsin have expressed adversity to the
nonliability rule but felt that a change required legislative action. See, e.g., Bond v.
City of Pittsburgh, 368 Pa. 404, 407, 84 A.2d 328, 330 (1951). On the other hand,
it has been suggested that the courts may change the nonliability rule, since it was
their creation. See 38 COL. L. REv. 1485, 1489 (1938).
11. Note, Nuisance, Negligence and the Overlapping of Torts, 3 MODERN L. Rzv.
305 (1940) ; Comment, 23 CALIF. L. Rxv. 427 (1935).
12. See McFarlane v. City of Niagara Falls, 247 N.Y. 340, 345, 160 N.E. 391,
392 (1928).
Two justices dissented from the instant decision because the complaint lacked an
allegation that the ice had been on the sidewalk an unreasonable amount of time. The
majority emphasized language in the complaint which said defendant's servants "al-
lowed and permitted" defective gutters and "knew or should have known" of the
hazard to users of the sidewalk. Instant case at 899, 900.
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expand the scope of the already vague nuisance concept 13 in order to
restrict nonliability as much as possible, just as it has done in the field of
municipal immunity.14 However, McFarlane pierced the nuisance label to
prevent a careless plaintiff from recovering, while this decision employs the
label to reward a deserving plaintiff at the expense of a defendant who
would otherwise be protected by the archaic charitable nonliability rule.
Constitutional Law-
Courts-
PENNSYLVANIA COURT RULE BANS
OUT-OF-COURT PHOTOGRAPHY
The judges of Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania, acting for the
courts of common pleas, oyer and terminer, and quarter sessions of that
county,' promulgated a rule which prohibits the taking of any photographs
in the courthouse, either while court is in session or during recesses, and
photographing any inmate or prisoner while in jail or enroute to or from
the courthouse.2 On application of several newspaper publishers, a United
States district court granted a temporary restraining order prohibiting
enforcement of the rule except as to pictures taken in and near the court-
room. After oral argument, the district court denied a motion to dissolve
this order and retained jurisdiction pending a determination by the Penn-
13. That the term nuisance is less definite than negligence is evident from the
fact that nuisance law contains no consistently applied criterion like the "reasonable
man" standard which has long existed in negligence. "Nuisance" has been variously
defined. See, e.g., Waschak v. Moffatt, 173 Pa. Super. 209, 215, 96 A.2d 163, 166
(1953) ; Levy v. Bryce, 46 A.2d 765, 766 (D.C. Munic. App. 1946). Courts of other
states, including Wisconsin, have regarded it as incapable of precise definition. See
Lindemeyer v. City of Milwaukee, 241 Wis. 637, 640, 6 N.W.2d 653 (1942);
Engle v. State, 53 Ariz. 458, 464, 90 P.2d 988, 991 (1939) ; Rose v. Socony-Vacuum
Corp., 54 R.I. 411, 414, 173 AtI. 627, 628 (1934). Prosser regards public nuisance
as a "catch-all." See PROSSER, TORTS 552 (1941). Professors Prosser and Seavey
have disagreed as to whether nuisance refers to a type of wrongful conduct or to a
type of injurious effect resulting from such conduct. Compare PROSSER, TORTS 553
(1941) with Seavey, Nuisance: Contributory Negligence and Other Mysteries, 65
HARv. L. Rxv. 984, 985 (1952).
14. See Note, Inroads Upon Municipal Inmnunity in Tort, 46 HARv. L. REv.
305 (1932).
1. The same judges sit in the three courts. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 332,
372 (Purdon 1930).
2. "No one shall take any pictures inside of the courthouse during any session
of the court, or the recesses between sessions, and no person, litigant, prosecutor,
defendant, plaintiff, claimant or respondent, juror, or witness shall be photographed
or have his or her or their pictures taken in a court room or in any of the halls,
corridors or approaches thereto during any session of the court or recesses between
sessions, and no prisoner, or inmate of the county jail shall be photographed in the
jail or in any of the approaches thereto or on his way to or from a session of court."
The Tribune Review Pub. Co. v. Thomas, U.S. District Ct., W.D. Pa., March 12,
1954, p. 2.
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sylvania Supreme Court of any questions of state law raised by the rule.3
Every court has authority to make rules for the fair and expedient
administration of justice, but these rules may not change existing substan-
tive law 4 or exceed a court's power to enforce them. In Pennsylvania, the
Supreme Court prescribes rules of civil procedure for the common pleas
courts, 5 and these lower courts may make additional rules "for the conduct
of . . . business," provided they do not conflict with those of the Su-
preme Court.0 Since a Supreme Court rule prohibits only photographs
taken in the courtroom during trial,7 it may be argued that a common pleas
court is precluded from adopting a broader rule. The county criminal
courts are authorized by the legislature to make their own rules "for [the]
expediting of . . . proceedings," 8 but it is unlikely that the Westmore-
land County court can justify its rule under this statute.9 Other limitations
which may make enforcement of this rule impossible arise from the scope
of the contempt power, the court's primary sanction. At common law, out-
of-court publications tending to obstruct justice could be treated as con-
structive contempt and punished summarily.' 0 While English courts have
retained a strong contempt power in this area," it has been restricted in
this country.12  In Pennsylvania, contempt may be used to punish misbe-
haviour in the courtroom which obstructs justice 13 and activity outside it
3. The Tribune Review Pub. Co. v. Thomas, supra note 2. A petition for a
writ of prohibition was filed with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and was argued
in the week of May 24, 1954. Although the district court opinion indicates that only
state questions are to be determined in the state court, id., Conclusions of Law 12,
14, petitioner has pressed federal constitutional questions on the Pennsylvania court.
An interesting problem will arise if this latter court decides the federal issues. Cf.
Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. Walsh, 135 Conn. 37, 40-1, 61 A.2d 89, 92 (1948).
4. Kelly v. Pennsylvania Co., 253 Pa. 553, 98 Atl. 767 (1916) ; see Washington-
Southern Nay. Co. v. Baltimore Steamboat Co., 263 U.S. 629, 635 (1924) (rule
may not abrogate common law). See also PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 61, 62 (Purdon
Supp. 1953).
5. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 62 (Purdon Supp. 1953); see 18 U.S.C. §§ 3771,
3772 (Supp. 1952); FEn. R. CRIm. P. 57(a).
6. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 62 (Purdon Supp. 1953).
7. PA. R. Civ. P. 223(b).
8. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 361 (Purdon 1930).
9. If the ban on photographing prisoners purports to regulate the county jail,
it would seem to be outside the authority of the county judges acting alone to make
such a regulation since the power to make rules for the jail is lodged in a board of
of supervisors. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, §§ 408, 409 (Purdon Supp. 1953).
10. See Note, Controlling Press and Radio Influence on Trials, 63 HARv. L. REv.
840, 848 (1950). See also Respublica v. Oswald, 1 Dallas 318 (Pa. 1788).
11. See The King v. Daily Mirror, [1927] 1 K.B. 5 (contempt citation upheld
for publishing photograph of accused where an identity question would arise at the
trial). See also Goodhart, Newspapers and Contempt of Court in English Law, 48
HARV. L. REv. 885 (1935).
12. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 401 (Supp. 1952); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 2041, 2044
(Purdon 1930). See Nelles and King, Contempt by Publication in the United States,
28 CoL. L. R-.v. 401 and 525 (1928) (history of the federal and Pennsylvania statutes).
Not all courts have allowed interference by the legislature with the contempt power.
See THOMAS, PROBLEMS OF CONTEMlT OF CotRT 50-2 (1934).
13. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2041 (III) (Purdon 1930).
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having the same effect. 14 However, an express statutory provision forbids
summary punishment for any out-of-court publication concerning pending
cases. 15 Although it was drafted prior to the invention of the art of
photography, the language and broad intent indicate a design to prohibit all
summary proceedings against any out-of-court publication. 0
Where freedom of the press is involved, exercise of the contempt power
is limited further by constitutional provisions. The United States Su-
preme Court has held that a court is justified in restricting the press only
when confronted with a clear and present danger to judicial administra-
tion,'7 a test which has been adopted by Pennsylvania in interpreting its
own constitution.' 8 The language of the Supreme Court cases interprets
broadly the right to publish without restraint, 9 although the factual situa-
tions involved attempts to influence decisions of the judge rather than a
witness or a jury.20  In Baltimore Radio Show, Inc. v. State,21 a state
court refused to differentiate and held that there was no clear and present
danger which justified punishment by contempt even though the defendant
alleged that publication of his criminal record and confession made it im-
possible to get an unbiased jury. The First Amendment is designed to
protect all media of expression and, since the Supreme Court has held that
motion pictures are within this guarantee,22 it seems that photography is
also included.
Courts have given little 'consideration to photography's place in re-
porting judicial proceedingstm and, since new modes of expression may give
14. Compare PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §2041(111) (Purdon 1930), with PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 17, § 2042 (Purdon 1930). See Greason v. Cumberland Ry. Co., 54 Pa.
Super. 595 (1913) ; cf. Marks' Appeal, 144 Pa. Super. 556, 20 A.2d 242 (1941). .
15. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2044 (Purdon 1930). This statute apparently leaves
as the only remedies civil and criminal libel actions. Id. § 2045. See Foster v.
Commonwealth, 8 W. & S. 77 (Pa. 1844).
16. See the history of the events leading to the passing of the act in Nelles and
King, supra note 12, at 409-15. Cf. Louka v. Park Entertainments, Inc., 294 Mass.
268, 1 N.E.2d 41 (1936) (unauthorized showing of plaintiff's picture a libellous
publication).
17. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331
(1946) ; Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941). See Note, Controlling Press and
Radio Influence on Trials, 63 HARv. L. Rnv. 840, 850 (1950). The instant rule is
similar to a prior restraint on publication which is justified only where there is a clear
and present danger which will cause a substantive evil. Near v. Minnesota, 283
U.S. 697, 716 (1931) ; Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
18. Commonwealth v. Feigenbaum, 166 Pa. Super, 120, 70 A.2d 389 (1950).
19. E.g., Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263, 270 (1941).
20. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947) (unfair reporting of events in a case
and editorial attack on trial judge); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946)
(editorial attack on trial court actions in nonjury proceedings) ; Bridges v. California,
314 U.S. 252 (1941) (editorial comment on pending cases and threat to cause labor
strike in event of enforcement of court decree).
21. 193 Md. 300, 67 A.2d 497 (1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 912 (1950).
22. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501-2 (1952).
23. But see State v. Clifford, 118 N.E.2d 853 (Ohio 1954), affirming a judgment
for contempt against violators of a court order which prohibited photographs while
court was in session. The order was sustained as preserving a litigant's constitutional
right to a fair trial, and not conflicting with freedom of the press.
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rise to different needs for control,24 whether photographs are to receive
constitutional protection identical to that given to the press depends on the
similarity between these two modes of communication. The extensive use of
photographs closely integrated with news reporting indicates that photog-
raphy has become an essential part of news dissemination. Photography
has been accorded different treatment within the courtroom since it creates
distractions and noise, and detracts from the decorum of the court.25 Thus,
both Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the American
Bar Association Judicial Canon 35 28 proscribe taking photographs inside
the courtroom. Outside the courtroom, however, with the exception of
activity so near the court as to disturb it,27 this distinction does not seem
to exist. So far as privacy is concerned, once it is conceded that public
curiosity should be satisfied as to individuals who are involved in legal
proceedings, particularly criminal prosecution, the additional notoriety
resulting from the use of photographs is no ground for protection.28
Photographs published prior to trial may influence witnesses or members
of a jury, but they are no different from advance publications of other evi-
dence, such as confessions or past criminal records,29 which have thus far
been insufficient to justify restraint.30 A more serious problem arises when
the wrongdoer's identity is in issue because the testimony of a witness, either
24. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952).
25. See McCoy, The .udge and Courtroom Publicity, 37 J. Am. JUn. Soc'y 167,
178 (1954) ; Report of the Special Committee on Televising and Broadcasting Legis-
lative and Iudicial Proceedings, 77 A.B.A. REP. 607, 609 (1952). Impetus was given
to the banning of photographers from the courtroom following the Hauptmann trial
for the kidnapping of the Lindbergh baby. State v. Hauptmann, 115 N.J.L. 412, 180
Atl. 809 (Ct. Err. & App.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 649 (1935). See McCoy, supra at
169; Robbins, The Hauptinann Trial in the Light of English Criminal Procedure,
21 A.B.A.J. 301, 304 (1935).
26. 77 A.B.A. REP. 110 (1952). The judicial canon has been adopted in fourteen
states and similar provisions have been adopted in several others. Various United
States District Courts have promulgated a similar rule. 37 J. Am. JuD. Soc'v 150,
154, 186 (1954). See State v. Clifford, 118 N.E.2d 853, 855 (Ohio 1954), stating that
this rule has received such widespread acceptance as necessary to an impartial ad-
ministration of justice that it was impossible to hold that the trial court had abused
its discretion by promulgating it.
27. See In re Seed, 140 Misc. 681, 683-4, 251 N.Y.S. 615, 618 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
28. Berg v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 79 F. Supp. 957 (D. Minn. 1948);
Elmhurst v. Pearson, 153 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1946). But cf. Ex parte Sturm, 152
Md. 114, 136 Atl. 312 (1927). Although the language of the Sturm case stresses a
judicial duty to protect a litigant from adverse publicity, id. at 119-20, 136 Atl. at 314,
the facts concerned photographs surreptitiously taken in court in violation of a court
order, a situation appropriate for action to promote judicial administration.
During oral argument for the writ of prohibition in the Tribune Review case
(see note 3 supra), Chief Justice Stern of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated
that a man's face is his property and "cannot be photographed without his consent."
N.Y. Times, May 26, 1954, p. 31, col. 7.
29. See, e.g., Baltimore Radio Show, Inc. v. State, 193 Md. 300, 67 A.2d 497
(1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 912 (1950) ; Robbins, supra note 25.
30. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc. v. State, supra note 29, at 326-30, 67 A.2d at
509-11; State v. Hauptmann, 115 N.J.L. 412, 444, 180 Atl. 809, 828, cert. denied, 296
U.S. 649 (1935); cf. Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 349 (1946); Bridges v.
California, 314 U.S. 252, 278 (1941).
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in a police line-up or at trial, may be a mere repetition of his exposure to
the accused's picture in a newspaper. The ban on photographing inmates
or prisoners apparently is an attempt to solve this problem, although it may
not achieve its purpose because it does not.include photographs of the
accused taken at some previous time. Perhaps a court might sustain a
specific ban if it believed that publication of a photograph might deny a
defendant a fair trial, but if news photographs are to receive the same con-
stitutional protection given to reporting, it is doubtful that the clear and
present danger requirement can be met.
Constitutional Law-
PEDERAL-STATE RELATIONSHIP-PENNSYLVANIA
SEDITION ACT HELD SUPERSEDED
BY SMITH ACT
Defendant was convicted of attempting to overthrow the Government
of the United States by force and violence in violation of the Pennsylvania
Sedition Act.' Subsequently, on substantially the same evidence, he was
convicted 2 of violating the Smith Act 3  The first conviction was reversed
by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on the ground that the Smith Act
superseded and suspended the state act. The court held that congressional
intent to supersede could be implied, as the paramount interest in pro-
tecting the United States from overthrow lay in the Federal Government
and exclusive federal control was required to enforce the Smith Act effec-
tively. Commonwealth v. Nelson,4 377 Pa. 58, 104 A.2d 133 (1954).
1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4207 (Purdon 1945). The Act provides that sedition
is any conduct, the intent of which is "[t]o encourage any person to . . . engage in
any conduct with a view of overthrowing or destroying or attempting to overthrow
or destroy, by any force or show or threat of force, the Government of this State or
of the United States."
2. For the history of this case in the federal courts, see United States v. Mesarosh,
13 F.R.D. 180 (W.D. Pa. 1952); United States v. Mesarosh, 115 F. Supp. 332 (W.D.
Pa. 1953) ; United States v. Mesarosh, 116 F. Supp. 345 (W.D. Pa. 1953). The appeal
from conviction was heard June 7, 1954, before the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit (Nos. 11169-73).
3. 62 STAT. 808 (1948), 18 U.S.C. §2385 (Supp. 1949), based on 54 STAT. 670,
671 (1940), 18 U.S.C. §§ 10, 11, 13 (1940).
4. The decision was four to one. A collection of state statutes as of 1950 is found
in THE STATES AND SuBvERsioN 414 et seq. (Gellhorn ed. 1952). The right of the
state attorney general to investigate subversives under the New Hampshire Subver-
sive Act, N.H. Laws 1951, c. 193, p. 410, was upheld in Nelson v. Wyman, 22 U.S.L.
WEEK 2544 (N.H. April 30, 1954). The court stated the New Hampshire Act was
not in conflict with the Smith Act.
The court in the instant case did not say whether the entire law was superseded,
or only that part dealing with overthrow of the Federal Government. The Smith Act
extends protection to ".. . the Government of the United States or the Government
of any State, Territory, District or Possession thereof ... " 62 STAT. 808 (1948),
18 U.S.C. § 2385 (Supp. 1949).
19541
1090 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 102
Not only may state 5 and federal governments 6 legislate against violent
overthrow of their respective governments, but each may legislate against
overthrow of the other in the absence of the latter's action.7 However,
when both governments exercise these powers at the same time, a question
arises of supersession of the state by the federal law,8 and in case of direct
conflict the federal law must prevail. 9 Where no direct conflict exists
and both governments have a legitimate interest in the area regulated,
courts determine supersession largely by weighing state and federal in-
terests,10 but explain their results in terms of congressional intent.-" Since
this intent is often unexpressed,' 2 the Supreme Court sometimes has found
an indication that Congress intended to preempt a field when Congress
has regulated in a complete and comprehensive manner 13 or when the
provisions and purposes of the state and federal acts are the same. 14
Factually the instant case falls under the latter "rule," but this "rule" has
been rejected by the Court in some cases,' 5 and its rationale, that adminis-
5. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 667-8 (1925).
6. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 501 (1951). See 2 COOLEY, CoNsTiTU-
TIONAL LimITATIONS 898-908 (8th ed., Carrington, 1927), and FREUND, POLI E POWER
507-13 (1904), for the common law background of libels against government and the
development of sedition laws in the United States.
7. U.S. CoNsT. Art IV, § 4 guarantees each state a "Republican Form of Govern-
ment." The federal-state relationship is such that any attempt to destroy the United
States also imperils state sovereignty. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 668
(1925).
8. Cf. Mutchall v. City of Kalamazoo, 323 Mich. 215, 35 N.W.2d 245 (1948)
(state liquor law held not to bar municipal action in area not covered by state).
9. U.S. CONST. Art. VI (Supremacy Clause).
10. Powell, Current Conflicts Between the Commerce Clause and State Police
Power, 1922-1927, 12 MINN. L. REv. 607 (1928).
11. See California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 728-33 (1949); Bethlehem Steel Co. v.
New York State Labor Relation Board, 330 U.S. 767, 772-6 (1947) ; Cloverleaf But-
ter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148, 156 (1942); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52,
62 (1941).
12. See Powell, supra note 10, at 608-9.
13. This doctrine is often applied in the field of interstate commerce. See Clover-
leaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1942), holding that federal regulation of
the finished product of renovated butter precludes state action as to any of its com-
ponents. The decision provoked a strong dissent from Chief Justice Stone and Jus-
tice Frankfurter, both of whom have adhered to the view that a state law is super-
seded only where a direct conflict occurs. For a discussion of cases from 1936 to
1946, see Note, 60 HARv. L. REv. 262 (1946).
The problem of federal preemption of state labor laws by the Taft-Hartley Act
is dealt with by Cox and Seidman, Federalism and Labor Relations, 64 HAjv. L. REv.
211 (1950). For an attack on their conclusions and on the theory that Congress
can preempt a field by enacting a comprehensive law, see Petro, Participation by the
States in the Enforcement and Development of National Labor Policy, 28 NoT=E
DA-E LAw. 1 (1952). The problem was recently before the Pennsylvania court
in Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union, 373 Pa. 19, 94 A.2d 893
(1953), aff'd, 74 S. Ct. 161 (U.S. 1953), which held that the state Labor Relations
law was superseded by the federal law.
14. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66-7 (1941); Charleston & Western
Carolina Ry. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U.S. 597, 604 (1915) ; Houston v. Moore,
5 Wheat. 1, 22-3 (U.S. 1820).
15. California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949); Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325
(1920).
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tration by the states is likely to interfere with the objectives of the national
law, is derived from interstate commerce cases. Thus whatever validity
this "rule" has is based primarily on the policy of the commerce clause,
.freedom of commerce from burdens or economic discrimination,1 6 rather
than on the principal consideration in security cases, effective enforcement
of the law.
17
A state is unable to provide for enforcement of a federal law in its own
courts 18 since Congress has specifically limited the forum for federal laws
to federal courts.19 Thus, if the Federal Government fails to enfQrce a law
effectively in an area of vital concern to a state, the only remedy open to
the state is to pass a statute parallel to the federal law, and this may be
denied because of preemption. The two leading cases in the security
field reached opposite, though not necessarily inconsistent, holdings on this
point. Gilbert v. Minnesota, ° without discussing preemption in the major-
ity opinion, held a state law punishing interference with recruiting armed
forces personnel to be within the state police power, despite congressional
legislation on the matter. Hines v. Davidowitz21 held a state alien regis-
tration statute superseded by a similar federal act, on the ground that the
United States has exclusive power to control foreign relations and that the
civil rights of an alien are a federal concern. In Gilbert, since any riot
or serious disorder caused by interference with recruiting could have been
controlled without the state act under the police power to keep public
order, the decision, in allowing the state to punish mere oral agitation
against recruiting, indicates the Court's feeling that the Federal Government
could not or would not enforce the federal law. Thus, if Minnesota were
held superseded, there would be no enforcement in an area admittedly of
concern to the state. On the other hand, in Hines the alien registration
law was not directly related to the control of undesirable conduct, and an
imperative local enforcement problem was not presented. Also, the Federal
Government can enforce a registration law as well as the states and make
available to a state such information as it needs. The importance of the
enforcement factor is reaffirmed by California v. Zook,22 which upheld a
16. See Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767 (1945).
17. Where interstate commerce is directly affected, as by an interstate train, the
Court is not greatly concerned with enforcement, except in determining whether states
can act at all in the absence of Congressional action. But as commerce affects matters
of a more local nature, state enforcement becomes a more important consideration.
See California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949), discussed in text, at note 22 infra;
Commonwealth v. McHugh, 326 Mass. 249, 265, 93 N.E.2d 751, 762 (1950).
18. Constitutionally, there is no objection. See Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1
(U.S. 1820), in which Pennsylvania was allowed to court-martial militia who violated
the federal law, because Congress had not limited enforcement to federal courts-
martial. Warren, Federal Criminal Laws and the State Courts, 38 HARv. L. REv.
545 (1925), gives the early history on enforcement of federal laws in state courts.
19. 62 STAT. 826 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (Supp. 1949). Where Congress
provides that a federal law may be enforced "in any court of competent jurisdiction,"
state courts may not decline jurisdiction. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
20. 254 U.S. 325 (1920).
21. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
22. 336 U.S. 725 (1949). Consider also the state laws punishing the counter-
feiting or passing of counterfeit United States currency. The Supreme Court up-
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California law regulating nonscheduled motor carriers, although the ICC
had also undertaken to regulate the carriers. The decision turned to a
great extent on the fact that the ICC's staff was inadequate to cope with
the enforcement problem,23 and that the state had a strong interest in
having the law enforced.
2 4
In the instant case, the court rightly found that a propitious field for
state action was not presented. State enforcement of a sedition law may con-
flict with federal enforcement, which is subject to national policy objectives
not necessarily known or considered by the states. Also, premature or
spasmodic prosecution could cause irreparable harm by revealing informers,
and Pennsylvania criminal law, which allows a private person to institute
proceedings, 25 could be particularly troublesome in this respect. Thus pos-
sible conflicts provide sufficient reason for federal preemption, if effective
enforcement is assured. The Federal Government has the facilities for
investigating and prosecuting subversion, and has demonstrated both the
capacity and intent to deal with a worldwide conspiracy 2 6 Since, at this
time, it seems clear that such federal action as is necessary will be taken,
basing a decision on the probability of federal enforcement, though an ad
hoc approach, achieves an effective balance which satisfies the states'
primary need and at the same time preserves autonomy of action to the
Federal Government. Should it appear at some future date that the Fed-
eral Government is not capable of dealing with the problem, sufficient
grounds would then exist for allowing states to act.
held the validity of these laws in Fox v. Ohio, 5 How. 410 (U.S. 1847), and United
States v. Marigold, 9 How. 560 (U.S. 1850). Prior to 1860, Congress had provided
no special funds for the enforcement of counterfeiting laws, and the United States
Secret Service was not founded until July 5, 1865, so that the burden rested almost
entirely on the states. See 20 ENcYc. BRITANNICA 261 (1953). The Secret Service
apparently is effective now, for research failed to reveal any recent state prosecutions
for counterfeiting United States money.
23. California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 737 (1949).
24. Id. at 736.
25. See 1 SADLER, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN PENNSYLVANIA §§ 72-3 (2d ed.,
Henry, 1937).
26. REP. ATT'y GEN. 9-10 (1952).
